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Abstract
Symmetrical Multilevel Diversity Coding (SMDC) is a network compression problem
introduced by Roche (1992) and Yeung (1995). In this setting, a simple separate coding
strategy known as superposition coding was shown to be optimal in terms of achieving
the minimum sum rate (Roche, Yeung, and Hau, 1997) and the entire admissible rate
region (Yeung and Zhang, 1999) of the problem. This paper considers a natural general-
ization of SMDC to the secure communication setting with an additional eavesdropper.
It is required that all sources need to be kept perfectly secret from the eavesdropper as
long as the number of encoder outputs available at the eavesdropper is no more than a
given threshold. First, the problem of encoding individual sources is studied. A precise
characterization of the entire admissible rate region is established via a connection to
the problem of secure coding over a three-layer wiretap network and utilizing some basic
polyhedral structure of the admissible rate region. Building on this result, it is then
shown that superposition coding remains optimal in terms of achieving the minimum
sum rate for the general secure SMDC problem.
1 Introduction
Symmetrical Multilevel Diversity Coding (SMDC) is a source coding problem with L indepen-
dent discrete memoryless sources (S1, . . . , SL), where the importance of the sources is assumed
to decrease with the subscript l. The sources are to be encoded by a total of L encoders, where
the rate of the lth encoder output is Rl. The decoder can access a subset U ⊆ ΩL := {1, . . . , L}
of the encoder outputs. Which subset of the encoder outputs is available at the decoder is
unknown a priori at the encoders. However, no matter which subset U actually realizes, the
sources (S1, . . . , Sm) need to be asymptotically perfectly reconstructed at the decoder when-
ever |U | ≥ m. Note that the word “symmetrical” here refers to the fact that the sources that
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need to be reconstructed at the decoder depend on the available subset of the encoder outputs
only via its cardinality. The rate allocations at different encoders, however, can be different
and are not necessarily symmetrical.
The problem of Multilevel Diversity Coding (MDC) was introduced by Roche [1] and Yeung
[2] in the early 1990s. In particular, [2] considered the simple coding strategy of separately
encoding different sources at the encoders, subsequently referred to as superposition coding.
The aforementioned SMDC problem was first systematically studied in [3], where it was shown
that superposition coding can achieve the minimum sum rate for the general SMDC problem
(with an arbitrary total number of encoders L) and the entire admissible rate region with
L = 3 encoders. The problem regarding whether superposition coding can achieve the entire
admissible rate region for the general SMDC problem, however, remained open. Finally, in a
very elegant (albeit highly technical) paper [4], Yeung and Zhang resolved the open problem
by positive through the so-called α-resolution method.
Recent years have seen a flurry of research on information-theoretic security. See [5] and [6]
for surveys of recent progress in this field. Motivated by this renewed interest, in this paper
we consider the problem of Secure Symmetrical Multilevel Diversity Coding (S-SMDC) in the
presence of an additional eavesdropper. Specifically, a collection of L−N independent discrete
memoryless sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) are to be encoded by a total of L encoders, where the
rate of the lth encoder output is Rl. A legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper can access
a subset U ⊆ ΩL and A ⊆ ΩL of the encoder outputs, respectively. Which subsets of the
encoder outputs are available at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are unknown
a priori at the encoders. However, no matter which subsets U and A actually occur, the
sources (S1, . . . , Sk) need to be asymptotically perfectly reconstructed at the legitimate receiver
whenever |U | ≥ N +k, and the entire collection of the sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) needs to be kept
perfectly secret from the eavesdropper as long as |A| ≤ N . As before, the word “symmetrical”
here refers to the access structure at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, but not to
the rate allocations at different encoders. We envision that such a communication scenario
is useful for designing distributed information storage systems [1] where information retrieval
needs to be both robust and secure.
As mentioned previously, separate encoding of different sources (superposition coding) can
achieve the entire admissible rate region for the general SMDC problem without any secrecy
constraints [4]. It is thus natural to ask whether the same separate encoding strategy would
remain optimal for the general S-SMDC problems. For the classical SMDC problems without
any secrecy constraints, the problem of efficient encoding of individual sources is essentially
to transmit the source over an erasure channel and is well understood based on the earlier
work of Singleton [7]. For the S-SMDC problems, however, the problem of efficient encoding
of individual sources is closely related to the problem of secure coding over a Wiretap Network
(WN) [8], which, in its most general setting, is a very challenging problem in information-
theoretic security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we focus on the problem of
encoding individual sources, i.e., Secure Symmetrical Single-level Diversity Coding (S-SSDC).
By leveraging the results of [8] on secure coding over a three-layer WN and utilizing some
basic polyhedral structure of the admissible rate region, we provide a precise characterization
of the entire admissible rate region for the general S-SSDC problem. Building on this result,
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in Sec. 3 we show that superposition coding can achieve the minimum sum rate for the general
S-SMDC problem. Finally, in Sec. 4 we conclude the paper with some remarks.
2 Secure Symmetrical Single-Level Diversity Coding
2.1 Problem Statement
Let {S[t]}∞t=1 be a discrete memoryless source with time index t and let S
n := (S[1], . . . , S[n]).
An (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem consists of a set of L encoders, a legitimate receiver who has
access to a subset U ⊆ ΩL of the encoder outputs, and an eavesdropper who has access to a
subset A ⊆ ΩL of the encoder outputs. Which subsets of the encoder outputs are available at
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are unknown a priori at the encoders. However,
no matter which subsets U and A actually occur, the legitimate receiver must be able to
asymptotically perfectly reconstruct the source whenever |U | ≥ m, and the source must be
kept perfectly secret from the eavesdropper as long as |A| ≤ N . Obviously, reliable and secure
communication of the source is possible only when m > N .
Formally, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code is defined by a collection of L encoding functions
el : S
n ×K → {1, . . . ,Ml}, ∀l = 1, . . . , L (1)
and decoding functions
dU :
∏
l∈U
{1, . . . ,Ml} → S
n, ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ m. (2)
Here, K denotes the key space accessible to all L encoders. There are no limitations on the
size of the key space K. However, the secret key is only shared by the encoders, but not
with the legitimate receiver or the eavesdropper. A nonnegative rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) is
said to be admissible if for every ǫ > 0, there exits, for sufficiently large block length n, an
(n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code such that:
• (Rate constraints)
1
n
logMl ≤ Rl + ǫ, ∀l = 1, . . . , L; (3)
• (Asymptotically perfect reconstruction at the legitimate receiver)
Pr{dU(XU) 6= S
n} ≤ ǫ, ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ m (4)
where Xl := el(S
n, K) is the output of the lth encoder, K is the secret key shared by all
L encoders, and XU := {Xl : l ∈ U}; and
• (Perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper)
H(Sn|XA) = H(S
n), ∀A ⊆ ΩL s.t. |A| ≤ N (5)
i.e., observing the encoder outputs XA does not provide any information regarding to
the source sequence Sn.
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The admissible rate region R is the collection of all admissible rate tuples (R1, . . . , RL).
The minimum sum rate Rms is defined as
Rms := min
(R1,...,RL)∈R
L∑
l=1
Rl. (6)
2.2 Main Results
The following lemma provides a simple outer bound on the admissible rate region of the general
S-SSDC problem. Let R(L, k,H) be the collection of all nonnegative rate tuples (R1, . . . , RL)
satisfying ∑
l∈D
Rl ≥ H, ∀D ∈ Ω
(k)
L (7)
where Ω
(k)
L is the collection of all subsets of ΩL of size k.
Lemma 1. For any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the admissible rate region
R ⊆ R(L,m−N,H(S)). (8)
Lemma 1 can be proved using standard information-theoretic techniques. For completeness,
a proof is included in Appendix A. The above outer bound is known to be tight in the following
two special cases:
1) When N = 0, the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem reduces to the classical (L,m) SSDC
problem without any secrecy constraints, for which the admissible rate region is known [7]
to be R(L,m,H(S)).
2) With N > 0 but m = N +1, a collection D of the encoder outputs will either lead to an
asymptotically perfect reconstruction of the source (whenever |D| ≥ N + 1), or provide
zero information on the source (whenever |D| ≤ N). In this case, the (L,N,m) S-SSDC
problem reduces to the classical (L,N) threshold secret sharing problem, for which the
admissible rate region is known [9, 10] to be R(L, 1, H(S)).
The main result of this section is that the outer bound R(L,m − N,H(S)) is in fact
the admissible rate region for the general S-SSDC problem, as summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. For any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the admissible rate region
R = R(L,m−N,H(S)). (9)
A proof of the theorem is provided in Sec. 2.3. To show that every rate tuple in R(L,m−
N,H(S)) is admissible, our proof proceeds in the following two steps. First, we show that for
any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the symmetrical rate tuple (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))
is admissible. In our proof, this is accomplished by relating the S-SSDC problem to the problem
of secure coding over a three-layer WN and using the result of [8, Th. 3] on an achievable secrecy
rate for the generic WN. Building on the previous result, next we show that every rate tuple
in R(L,m−N,H(S)) is admissible via an induction argument (inducting on the total number
of encoders L) and the following polyhedral structure of R(L, k,H).
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Proposition 1. R(L, k,H) is a pointed polyhedron in RL with the following structural prop-
erties:
1) The characteristic cone of R(L, k,H) is given by {(R1, . . . , RL) : Rl ≥ 0, ∀l = 1, . . . , L}.
2) Among all corner points (vertices) of R(L, k,H), (H/k, . . . , H/k) is the only one with
all strictly positive entries (if there exists any).
3) For any l = 1, . . . , L, the Rl = 0 slice of R(L, k,H) is isomorphic to R(L− 1, k− 1, H).
In particular, the RL = 0 slice of R(L, k,H) is identical to R(L− 1, k − 1, H), i.e.,
{(R1, . . . , RL−1) : (R1, . . . , RL−1, 0) ∈ R(L, k,H)} = R(L− 1, k − 1, H). (10)
Proof. Property 1 follows directly from the definition of characteristic cone [11, Lec. 2]. Prop-
erty 2 is due to the fact that
(R1, . . . , RL) = (H/k, . . . , H/k) (11)
is a solution to the equations ∑
l∈D
Rl = H, ∀D ∈ Ω
(k)
L . (12)
To see property 3, note that the Rl = 0 slice of R(L, k,H) is given by all nonnegative rate
tuples (R1, . . . , Rl−1, Rl+1, . . . , RL) satisfying∑
d∈D
Rd ≥ H, ∀D ∈ Ω
(k−1)
L\{l} ∪ Ω
(k)
L\{l} (13)
where Ω
(k)
L\{l} denotes all subsets of ΩL \ {l} of size k. Since every inequality with D ∈ Ω
(k)
L\{l}
is dominated by every inequality with D′ ∈ Ω(k−1)
L\{l} and such that D
′ ⊆ D, we have the desired
property.
Fig. 1 illustrates the above polyhedral structure of R(L, k,H) for L = 2 and 3. The
following corollary summarizes the minimum sum rate for the general S-SSDC problem.
Corollary 2. For any (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem, the minimum sum rate
Rms =
L
m−N
H(S). (14)
Proof. Let us first verify that
min
(R1,...,RL)∈R(L,k,H)
L∑
l=1
Rl =
L
k
H. (15)
For any rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) ∈ R(L, k,H), we have∑
l∈D
Rl ≥ H, ∀D ∈ Ω
(k)
L . (16)
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Figure 1: Illustration of the rate region R(L, k,H) for L = 2 and 3. The Rl = 0 slices of
R(3, 1, H) are empty sets, and the Rl = 0 slices of R(3, 2, H) are isomorphic to R(2, 1, H).
Summing over all D ∈ Ω
(k)
L gives
∑
D∈Ω
(k)
L
∑
l∈D
Rl =
(
L− 1
k − 1
) L∑
l=1
Rl ≥
(
L
k
)
H. (17)
We thus have
L∑
l=1
Rl ≥
(
L
k
)
(
L− 1
k − 1
)H = L
k
H (18)
for any rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) ∈ R(L, k,H). On the other hand, note that the symmetrical
rate tuple
(H/k, . . . , H/k) ∈ R(L, k,H) (19)
so
min
(R1,...,RL)∈R(L,k,H)
L∑
l=1
Rl ≤
L
k
H. (20)
Combining (18) and (20) completes the proof of (15).
Now by Theorem 1,
Rms = min
(R1,...,RL)∈R
L∑
l=1
Rl = min
(R1,...,RL)∈R(L,m−N,H(S))
L∑
l=1
Rl =
L
m−N
H(S). (21)
This completes the proof of the corollary.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the (L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) WN.
2.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Let us first show that the symmetrical rate tuple (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N)) is admis-
sible by considering the following simple source-channel separation scheme for the (L,N,m)
S-SSDC problem:
• First compress the source sequence Sn into a source message W using a fixed-length
lossless source code. It is well known [12, Ch. 3.2] that the rate R of the source message
W can be made arbitrarily close to the entropy rate H(S) for sufficiently large block
length n.
• Next, the source message W is delivered to the legitimate receiver using a secure
(L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL))
WN code.
The problem of secure coding over a WN was formally introduced in [8]. A generic WN
(G, s,U ,A) consists of a directed acyclic network G, a source node s, a set of user nodes U ,
and a collection of sets of wiretapped edges A. Each member of A may be fully accessed by
an eavesdropper, but no eavesdropper may access more than one member of A. The source
node has access to a message W , which is intended for all user nodes in U but needs to be
kept perfectly secret from the eavesdroppers. The maximum achievable secrecy rate for W is
called the secrecy capacity of the WN and is denoted by Cs(G, s,U ,A).
An (L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) WN is a special WN with three layers of nodes: top, middle,
and bottom. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the only node in the top layer is the source node s. There
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are L intermediate nodes in the middle layer, each corresponding to an encoder in the (L,N,m)
S-SSDC problem. For each l = 1, . . . , L, the source node s is connected to the intermediate
node l by a channel (s, l) with capacity Rl. There are
|U| =
(
L
m
)
(22)
user nodes in the bottom layer, each corresponding to a possible realization of the legitimate
receiver in the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem and is connected to m intermediate nodes through
m infinite-capacity channels. Finally, the collection of sets of wiretapped edges A is defined as
A :=
{
{(s, l)|l ∈ A} : A ∈ Ω(N)L
}
(23)
where each set of wiretapped edges in A corresponds to a possible realization of the eavesdrop-
per in the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem.
Based on the aforementioned connection between the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem and the
problem of secure coding over the (L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) WN, we have the following simple
lemma.
Lemma 2. A nonnegative rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) is admissible for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC
problem if the entropy rate of the source is less than or equal to the secrecy capacity of the
(L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)) WN, i.e.,
H(S) ≤ Cs(L,N,m, (R1, . . . , RL)). (24)
In general, characterizing the exact secrecy capacity of a WN can be very difficult. For a
generic WN (G, s,U ,A), the following secrecy rate
Rs = min
u∈U ,A∈A
[mincut(s, u)−mincut(s, A)] (25)
is known [8] to be achievable. Here, mincut(s, u) denotes the value of a minimum cut between
the source node s and the user node u, and mincut(s, A) denotes the value of a minimum cut
between the source node s and the set of wiretapped edges A. For the (L,N,m, (H(S)/(m−
N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))) WN, it is straightforward to verify that
mincut(s, u) =
m
m−N
H(S), ∀u ∈ U (26)
and
mincut(s, A) =
N
m−N
H(S), ∀A ∈ A. (27)
Hence, the secrecy rate
Rs =
m
m−N
H(S)−
N
m−N
H(S) = H(S) (28)
is achievable for the (L,N,m, (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))) WN. We summarize this
result in the following lemma.
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Lemma 3. For any (L,N,m, (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))) WN, the secrecy capacity
can be bounded from below as
Cs(L,N,m, (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N))) ≥ H(S). (29)
Combining Lemmas 2 and 3 proves the admissibility of the symmetrical rate tuple
(H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N)) .
Building on the previous result, next we show that every rate tuple in R(L,m−N,H(S))
is admissible. By Proposition 1, R(L,m − N,H(S)) is a pointed polyhedron with the char-
acteristic cone given by {(R1, . . . , RL) : Rl ≥ 0, ∀l = 1, . . . , L}. Thus, to show that all rate
tuples in R(L,m − N,H(S)) are admissible, it is sufficient to show that all corner points of
R(L,m−N,H(S)) are admissible.
We shall consider proof by induction, where the induction is on the total number of encoders
L. First consider the base case with L = 2. When L = 2, there is only one nontrivial (L,N,m)
S-SSDC problem: the (2, 1, 2) S-SSDC problem. Note that the rate region R(2, 1, H(S)) has
only one corner point: the symmetrical rate pair (H(S), H(S)), whose admissibility has already
been established. We thus conclude that every rate tuple in R(2, 1, H(S)) is admissible for the
(2, 1, 2) S-SSDC problem.
Now assume that for every nontrivial (L − 1, N ′, m′) S-SSDC problem, all rate tuples in
R(L′, m′ −N ′, H(S)) are admissible. Based on this assumption, next we show that all corner
points of R(L,m − N,H(S)) are admissible for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem. We shall
consider the corner points with all strictly positive entries (it they exist) and those with at
least one zero entry separately:
1) By Proposition 1, the symmetrical rate tuple (H(S)/(m−N), . . . , H(S)/(m−N)) is the
only corner point of R(L,m − N,H(S)) with all strictly positive entries (if it exists),
whose admissibility has already been established.
2) To prove the admissibility of the corner points ofR(L,m−N,H(S)) with at least one zero
entry, by the symmetry of the rate regionR(L,m−N,H(S)) we may consider without loss
of generality those with RL = 0. Note that if an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML−1)) code satisfies both
asymptotically perfect reconstruction constraint (4) and the perfect secrecy constraint (5)
for the (L− 1, N,m− 1) S-SSDC problem, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML−1, 1)) code with the same
encoding functions for encoders 1 to L−1 (encoder L uses a constant encoding function)
also satisfies (trivially) both constraints for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem. Thus, if
(R1, . . . , RL−1) is an admissible rate tuple for the (L − 1, N,m − 1) S-SSDC problem,
then (R1, . . . , RL−1, 0) is also an admissible rate tuple for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem.
By the induction assumption, all rate tuples in R(L−1, m−N −1, H(S)) are admissible
for the (L − 1, N,m − 1) problem. Combined with Proposition 1, this implies that all
rate tuples in
{(R1, . . . , RL−1, 0) : (R1, . . . , RL−1) ∈ R(L− 1, m−N − 1, H(S))}
= {(R1, . . . , RL) ∈ R(L,m−N,H(S)) : RL = 0}
(30)
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i.e., the RL = 0 slice of R(L,m − N,H(S)), are admissible for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC
problem. As a special case, all corner points of R(L,m − N,H(S)) with RL = 0 are
admissible for the (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem.
Combining Steps 1 and 2 proves that all corner points ofR(L,m−N,H(S)) are admissible.
We thus conclude that all rate tuples in R(L,m − N,H(S)) are admissible. This completes
the induction step and hence the proof of the theorem.
3 Secure Symmetrical Multilevel Diversity Coding
3.1 Problem Statement
Let {S1[t], . . . , SL−N [t]}
∞
t=1 be a collection of L − N independent discrete memoryless sources
with time index t and let Snk := (Sk[1], . . . , Sk[n]). An (L,N) S-SMDC problem consists
of a set of L encoders, a legitimate receiver who has access to a subset U of the encoder
outputs, and an eavesdropper who has access to a subset A of the encoder outputs. Which
subsets of the encoder outputs are available at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
are unknown a priori at the encoders. However, no matter which subsets U and A actually
occur, the legitimate receiver must be able to asymptotically perfectly reconstruct the sources
(S1, . . . , Sk) whenever |U | = N + k, and all sources (S1, . . . , SL−N) must be kept perfectly
secure from the eavesdropper as long as |A| ≤ N .
Formally, an (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code is defined by a collection of L encoding functions
el :
L−N∏
k=1
Snk ×K → {1, . . . ,Ml}, ∀l = 1, . . . , L (31)
and decoding functions
dU :
∏
l∈U
{1, . . . ,Ml} →
|U |−N∏
k=1
Snk , ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ N + 1. (32)
Here, K is the key space accessible to all L encoders. A nonnegative rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL)
is said to be admissible if for every ǫ > 0, there exits, for sufficiently large block length n, an
(n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code such that:
• (Rate constraints)
1
n
logMl ≤ Rl + ǫ, ∀l = 1, . . . , L; (33)
• (Asymptotically perfect reconstruction at the legitimate receiver)
Pr{dU(XU) 6= (S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
|U |−N)} ≤ ǫ, ∀U ⊆ ΩL s.t. |U | ≥ N + 1 (34)
where Xl := el((S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
L−N), K) is the output of the lth encoder, K is the secret key
shared by all L encoders, and XU := {Xl : l ∈ U}; and
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• (Perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper)
H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
L−N |XA) = H(S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
L−N), ∀A ⊆ ΩL s.t. |A| ≤ N (35)
i.e., observing the encoder outputs XA does not provide any information regarding to
the source sequences (Sn1 , . . . , S
n
L−N).
3.2 Main Results
Motivated by the success of [2–4] on the classical SMDC problem without any secrecy con-
straints, here we focus on superposition coding where the output of the lth encoder Xl is given
by
Xl =
(
X
(1)
l , . . . , X
(L−N)
l
)
(36)
and X
(k)
l is the coded message for source Sk at the lth encoder using an (L,N,N + k) S-
SSDC code. Note here that all sources are encoded separately at the encoders, and there is
no coding across different sources. Thus, if (R
(k)
1 , . . . , R
(k)
L ) is an admissible rate tuple for the
(L,N,N + k) S-SSDC problem with source Sk, then the rate tuple
(R1, . . . , RL) =
(
L−N∑
k=1
R
(k)
1 , . . . ,
L−N∑
k=1
R
(k)
L
)
(37)
is admissible for the (L,N) S-SMDC problem.
By Corollary 2, the minimum sum rate for the (L,N,N + k) S-SSDC problem with source
Sk is given by (L/k)H(Sk). It follows that
∑L−N
k=1 (L/k)H(Sk) is the minimum sum rate that
can be achieved by superposition coding for the (L,N) S-SMDC problem. The main result of
this section is that
∑L−N
k=1 (L/k)H(Sk) is in fact the minimum sum rate that can be achieved
by any coding scheme for the (L,N) S-SMDC problem. Thus, superposition coding is optimal
in terms of achieving the minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem. We summarize
this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Superposition coding can achieve the minimum sum rate for the general (L,N)
S-SMDC problem, which is given by
Rms =
L−N∑
k=1
L
k
H(Sk). (38)
A proof of the theorem is provided in Sec 3.3. The proof uses an induction argument and is
built on the classical subset inequality of Han [12, Ch. 17.6] and the following key proposition.
Proposition 2. For any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code that satisfies both asymptotically perfect re-
construction constraint (34) and the perfect secrecy constraint (35), we have
H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k−1, XA) ≥ nH(Sk) +H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k , XA)− nδk(n, ǫ) (39)
where
δk(n, ǫ) := 1/n+ ǫ
k∑
α=1
log |Sα| (40)
for any A ∈ Ω
(N)
L and D ∈ Ω
(k)
L such that A ∩D = ∅ and any k = 1, . . . , L−N .
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3.3 Proof of the Main Results
Let us first prove Proposition 2. Since |A| = N , |D| = k, and A ∩D = ∅, we have |D ∪ A| =
N+k. For any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code that satisfies both asymptotically perfect reconstruction
constraint (34) and the perfect secrecy constraint (35), we have by Fano’s inequality
H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k |XD, XA) ≤ nδk(n, ǫ) (41)
and
H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k |XA) = H(S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k ). (42)
Thus,
H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k−1, XA) + nδk(n, ǫ)
≥ H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k−1, XA) +H(S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k |XD, XA) (43)
≥ H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k−1, XA) +H(S
n
k |S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k−1, XD, XA) (44)
= H(XD, S
n
k |S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k−1, XA) (45)
= H(Snk |S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k−1, XA) +H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k , XA) (46)
= H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k |XA)−H(S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k−1|XA) +H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k , XA) (47)
= H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k )−H(S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k−1|XA) +H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k , XA) (48)
≥ H(Sn1 , . . . , S
n
k )−H(S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k−1) +H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k , XA) (49)
= H(Snk |S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k−1) +H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k , XA) (50)
= H(Snk ) +H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k , XA) (51)
= nH(Sk) +H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
k , XA) (52)
where (43) follows from (41), (48) follows from (42), (49) follows from the fact that conditioning
reduces entropy, (51) follows from the fact that the sources S1, . . . , Sk are mutually indepen-
dent, and (52) follows from the fact that the source Sk is memoryless. Moving nδk(n, ǫ) to the
right-hand side of the inequality completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Building on the result of Proposition 2, next let us show that for any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML))
code that satisfies both asymptotically perfect reconstruction constraint (34) and the perfect
secrecy constraint (35) and any α = 1, . . . , L−N , we have
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) ≥
α∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆α −
α∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ) (53)
where
∆α :=
L(
L
N
)(
L−N
α
) ∑
A∈Ω
(N)
L
∑
D∈Ω
(α)
L\A
H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
α, XA)
α
. (54)
We shall consider proof by induction, where the induction is on α. First consider the base
case with α = 1. Let A ∈ Ω
(N)
L and let l ∈ ΩL \A. Applying Proposition 2 with k = 1, we have
H(Xl) ≥ nH(S1) +H(Xl|S
n
1 , XA)− nδ1(n, ǫ). (55)
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Averaging (55) over all l ∈ ΩL \ A and all A ∈ Ω
(N)
L , we have
1(
L
N
)(
L−N
1
) ∑
A∈Ω
(N)
L
∑
l∈ΩL\A
H(Xl) ≥ nH(S1) +
1
L
∆1 − nδ1(n, ǫ). (56)
Note that
1(
L
N
)(
L−N
1
) ∑
A∈Ω
(N)
L
∑
l∈ΩL\A
H(Xl) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
H(Xl). (57)
We thus have
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) ≥ nLH(S1) + ∆1 − nLδ1(n, ǫ) (58)
which completes the proof of the base case.
Now assume that (53) holds for α− 1 for some 2 ≤ α ≤ L−N . Based on this assumption,
next we show that (53) also holds for α. By the classical subset inequality of Han [12, Ch. 17.6],
for any A ∈ Ω
(N)
L we have
1
 L−N
α− 1


∑
D∈Ω
(α−1)
L\A
H(XD |S
n
1 ,...,S
n
α−1,XA)
α−1
≥ 1
 L−N
α


∑
D∈Ω
(α)
L\A
H(XD |S
n
1 ,...,S
n
α−1,XA)
α
.
(59)
It follows that
∆α−1 ≥
L(
L
N
)(
L−N
α
) ∑
A∈Ω
(N)
L
∑
D∈Ω
(α)
L\A
H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
α−1, XA)
α
. (60)
By Proposition 2, for any A ∈ Ω
(N)
L and any D ∈ Ω
(α)
L\A we have
H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
α−1, XA) ≥ nH(Sα) +H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
α, XA)− nδn(α, ǫ). (61)
Substituting (61) into (60) gives
∆α−1 ≥
L(
L
N
)(
L−N
α
) ∑
A∈Ω
(N)
L
∑
D∈Ω
(α)
L\A
nH(Sα) +H(XD|S
n
1 , . . . , S
n
α, XA)− nδα(n, ǫ)
α
(62)
=
nL
α
H(Sα) + ∆α − nLδα(n, ǫ). (63)
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By the induction assumption,
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) ≥
α−1∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆α−1 −
α−1∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ) (64)
≥
α−1∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) +
(
nL
α
H(Sα) + ∆α − nLδα(n, ǫ)
)
−
α−1∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ) (65)
=
α∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆α −
α∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ). (66)
This completes the proof of the induction step and hence (53).
Finally, let α = L −N in (53). For any admissible rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) and any ǫ > 0,
we have
n
L∑
l=1
(Rl + ǫ) ≥
L∑
l=1
H(Xl) (67)
≥
L−N∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk) + ∆L−N −
L−N∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ) (68)
≥
L−N∑
k=1
nL
k
H(Sk)−
L−N∑
k=1
nLδk(n, ǫ) (69)
where (69) follows from the fact that ∆L−N ≥ 0. Divide both sides of (69) by n and let n→∞
and ǫ→ 0. Note that δk(n, ǫ)→ 0 in the limit as n→∞ and ǫ→ 0 for all k = 1, . . . , L−N .
We thus have
L∑
l=1
Rl ≥
L−N∑
k=1
L
k
H(Sk) (70)
for any admissible rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper considered the problem of S-SMDC, which is a natural (perhaps also the simplest)
extension of the classical SMDC problem [1–4] to the secrecy communication setting. First,
the problem of encoding individual sources, i.e., the S-SSDC problem, was studied. A precise
characterization of the entire admissible rate region was established via a connection to the
problem of secure coding over a three-layer WN [8] and utilizing some basic polyhedral structure
of the admissible rate region. Building on this result, it was then shown that the simple coding
strategy of separately encoding individual sources at the encoders (superposition coding) can
achieve the minimum sum rate for the general S-SMDC problem.
Based on the result of Theorem 3 (and the fact that superposition coding can achieve the
entire admissible rate region for the classical SMDC problems without secrecy constraints), it is
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very tempting to conjecture that superposition coding can in fact achieve the entire admissible
rate region for the general S-SMDC problem. In Appendix B, we verify that this is indeed the
case for the simplest nontrivial S-SMDC problem: the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem. Our proof relies
on an explicit characterization of the superposition coding rate region via a Fourier-Motzkin
elimination procedure. The optimality of superposition coding is then established by carefully
using the results of Proposition 2.
Extending such a proof strategy to the general (L,N) S-SMDC problem, however, faces a
number of challenges. To begin with, the complexity of Fourier-Motzkin elimination procedure
grows unboundedly as the total number of encoders L increases. Thus, establishing an explicit
characterization of the superposition coding rate region for the general (L,N) S-SMDC problem
appears to be very difficult. An alternative strategy is to look for an implicit characterization
of the superposition coding rate region using optimal α-resolutions, similar to that [4] for the
classical SMDC problem without any secrecy constraints. In fact, note from Theorem 1 that the
admissible rate region of an (L,N,m) S-SSDC problem depends on the parameters N and m
only via its difference m−N . As mentioned previously in Sec. 2, when N = 0, the (L,N,m) S-
SSDC problem reduces to the classical (L,m) SSDC problem without any secrecy constraints.
Thus, the admissible rate region of the (L,N,N + k) S-SSDC problem with source Sk is
identical to that of the classical (L, k) SSDC problem with the same source. As a result, the
superposition coding rate region of the (L,N) S-SMDC problem with sources (S1, . . . , SL−N)
is identical to the superposition coding rate region of the classical SMDC problem with a total
of L encoders and sources (S1, . . . , SL) where the entropy rate of the source H(Sl) = 0 for
l = L − N + 1, . . . , L. Based on this observation, the α-resolution characterization of the
superposition coding rate region for the general SMDC problem can be directly translated to
the S-SMDC problem. It remains to see whether the properties provided in [4] on optimal α-
resolutions are sufficient for establishing the optimality of superposition coding for the general
S-SMDC problem. This problem is currently under our investigations.
A Proof of Lemma 1
Let D ∈ Ω
(m−N)
L and let A ∈ Ω
(N)
L\D. Since A∩D = ∅, we have |D∪A| = N+(m−N) = m. For
any (n, (M1, . . . ,ML)) code that satisfies both asymptotically perfect reconstruction constraint
(4) and the perfect secrecy constraint (5), we have by Fano’s inequality
H(Sn|XD, XA) ≤ nδ(n, ǫ) (71)
where
δ(n, ǫ) = 1/n+ ǫ log |S| (72)
and
H(Sn|XA) = H(S
n). (73)
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For any admissible rate tuple (R1, . . . , RL) and any ǫ > 0, we have
n
∑
l∈D
(Rl + ǫ) ≥
∑
l∈D
H(Xl) (74)
≥ H (XD) (75)
≥ H (XD|XA) (76)
≥ H (XD|XA) +H (S
n|XD, XA)− nδ(n, ǫ) (77)
= H (XD, S
n|XA)− nδ(n, ǫ) (78)
= H (Sn|XA) +H (XD|S
n, XA)− nδ(n, ǫ) (79)
≥ H (Sn|XA)− nδ(n, ǫ) (80)
= H (Sn)− nδ(n, ǫ) (81)
= nH(S)− nδ(n, ǫ) (82)
where (75) follows from the independence bound on entropy, (76) follows from the fact that
conditioning reduces entropy, (77) follows from (71), (81) follows from (73), and (82) follows
from the fact that the source S is memoryless. Divide both sides of (82) by n and let n→∞
and ǫ→ 0. Note that δ(n, ǫ)→ 0 in the limit as n→∞ and ǫ→ 0. We have from (82) that∑
l∈D
Rl ≥ H(S), ∀D ∈ Ω
(m−N)
L . (83)
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
B The Admissible Rate Region of the (3, 1) S-SMDC
Problem
In this appendix, we show that superposition coding can achieve the entire admissible rate
region for the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem (the simplest nontrivial S-SMDC problem). The result
is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Superposition coding can achieve the entire admissible rate region for the (3, 1)
S-SMDC problem, which is given by the collection of all rate triples (R1, R2, R3) satisfying
R1 ≥ H(S1)
R2 ≥ H(S1)
R3 ≥ H(S1)
R1 +R2 ≥ 2H(S1) +H(S2)
R2 +R3 ≥ 2H(S1) +H(S2)
R3 +R1 ≥ 2H(S1) +H(S2).
(84)
Proof. Achievability. Consider the superposition coding scheme that separately encodes the
sources S1 and S2 using the (3, 1, 2) and (3, 1, 3) S-SSDC codes, respectively. By Theo-
rem 1, the admissible rate region for the (3, 1, 2) S-SSDC problem is given by all rate triples
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(R
(1)
1 , R
(1)
2 , R
(1)
3 ) satisfying
R
(1)
1 ≥ H(S1)
R
(1)
2 ≥ H(S1)
R
(1)
3 ≥ H(S1)
(85)
and the admissible rate region for the (3, 1, 3) S-SSDC problem is given by all rate triples
(R
(2)
1 , R
(2)
2 , R
(2)
3 ) satisfying
R
(2)
1 ≥ 0
R
(2)
2 ≥ 0
R
(2)
3 ≥ 0
R
(2)
1 +R
(2)
2 ≥ H(S2)
R
(2)
2 +R
(2)
3 ≥ H(S2)
R
(2)
3 +R
(2)
1 ≥ H(S2).
(86)
Following (37), all rate triples (R1, R2, R3) as given by
Rl = R
(1)
l +R
(2)
l , ∀l = 1, 2, 3 (87)
are admissible via superposition coding. Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination to eliminate R
(k)
l ,
l = 1, 2, 3 and k = 1, 2, from (85)–(87), we obtain the explicit characterization of the superpo-
sition coding rate region for the (3, 1) S-SMDC problem as expressed by (84).
The converse. Next, we establish the optimality of superposition coding by proving that
every inequality in (84) must hold for all admissible rate triples (R1, R2, R3) for the (3, 1)
S-SMDC problem. Let
a⊕ b :=
{
a + b, if a+ b ≤ 3
a + b− 3, otherwise.
(88)
For any admissible rate triple (R1, R2, R3), any l = 1, 2, 3, and any ǫ > 0, we have
n(Rl + ǫ) ≥ H(Xl) (89)
≥ H(Xl|Xl⊕1) (90)
≥ nH(S1) +H(Xl|S
n
1 , Xl⊕1)− nδ1(n, ǫ) (91)
≥ nH(S1)− nδ1(n, ǫ) (92)
and
n(Rl +Rl⊕1 + 2ǫ)
≥ H(Xl) +H(Xl⊕1) (93)
≥ H(Xl|Xl⊕1) +H(Xl⊕1|Xl⊕2) (94)
≥ 2nH(S1) +H(Xl|S
n
1 , Xl⊕1) +H(Xl⊕1|S
n
1 , Xl⊕2)− 2nδ1(n, ǫ) (95)
≥ 2nH(S1) +H(Xl|S
n
1 , Xl⊕1, Xl⊕2) +H(Xl⊕1|S
n
1 , Xl⊕2)− 2nδ1(n, ǫ) (96)
= 2nH(S1) +H(Xl, Xl⊕1|S
n
1 , Xl⊕2)− 2nδ1(n, ǫ) (97)
≥ 2nH(S1) + (nH(S2) +H(Xl, Xl⊕1|S
n
1 , S
n
2 , Xl⊕2)− nδ2(n, ǫ))− 2nδ1(n, ǫ) (98)
≥ 2nH(S1) + nH(S2)− nδ2(n, ǫ)− 2nδ1(n, ǫ). (99)
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Here, (90), (94) and (96) follow from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and (91), (95)
and (98) follow from Proposition 2. Dividing both sides of (92) and (99) by n and letting
n→∞ and ǫ→ 0 complete the proof of the converse part of the theorem.
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